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1 Introduction
Diagonal arguments lie at the root of many fundamental phenomena in the foun-
dations of logic and mathematics. Recently, a striking form of diagonal argument
has appeared in the foundations of epistemic game theory, in a paper by Adam
Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler [10]. The core Brandenburger-Keisler re-
sult can be seen, as they observe, as a two-person or interactive version of Rus-
sell’s Paradox. This raises a number of fascinating questions at the interface of
epistemic game theory, logic and theoretical computer science:
1. Is the Brandenburger-Keisler argument (henceforth: ‘BK argument’) just one
example of a more general phenomenon, whereby mathematical structures
and arguments can be generalized from a familiar ‘one-person’ form to a
two- or multi-agent interactive form?
2. To address this question, a sharper understanding of the BK argument is
needed. The argument hinges on a statement involving the modalities be-
lieves and assumes. The statement has the form
Ann believes that Bob assumes that . . .
which is not familiar as it stands. Where does this believes-assumes pat-
tern come from? How exactly does it relate to the more familiar arguments
in the one-person case? In particular, can it be reduced to a one-person
argument?
3. Is there a natural multi-agent generalization of the BK argument? In par-
ticular, does it have a compositional structure, which allows a smooth gen-
eralization to any number of agents?
4. The main formal consequence of the BK argument is that there can be no
belief model which is ‘assumption-complete’ with respect to a collection of
predicates including those definable in the first-order language of the model.
Brandenburger and Keisler also give a positive result, a construction of a
topological model which is assumption-complete with respect to the posi-
tive fragment of first-order logic extended with the believes and assumes
modalities. They raise the question of a more general perspective on the
availability of such models.
We shall provide substantial answers to questions (2)–(4) above in the present
paper. These results also suggest that the Brandenburger-Keisler ‘paradox’ does
offer a good point of entry for considering the more general question (1).
The starting point for our approach is a classic paper by F. William Lawvere
from 1969 [16], in which he gave a simple form of the (one-person) diagonal
argument as a fixpoint lemma in a very general setting. This lemma lies at the
basis of a remarkable range of results. Lawvere’s ideas were amplified and given
a very attractive presentation in a recent paper by Noson Yanofsky [25].
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We reformulate the core BK argument as a fixpoint lemma. This immediately
puts it in the general genre of diagonal arguments, and in particular of the
Lawvere fixpoint lemma.
– The BK argument applies to (belief) relations, while the Lawvere argument
applies to functions (actually, abstractly to arrows in a category). To put
them on common ground, we give a novel relational reformulation of the
Lawvere argument.
– We analyze the exact logical resources required for our fixpoint version of
the BK argument, and show that it can be carried out in regular logic, the
fragment of first-order logic comprising sequents φ ⊢ ψ, where φ and ψ are
built from atomic formulas by conjunction and existential quantification.
Regular logic can be interpreted in any regular category, which covers a wide
range of types of mathematical structure. The Lawvere argument can also
be carried out in (a fragment of) regular logic. We can now recognize the
Lawvere argument as exactly the one-person version of the BK argument,
and interpret the key BK lemma as a reduction to the one-person Lawvere
argument.
– This analysis leads in turn to a smooth generalization of the BK argument
to multi-agent belief models. The content of the believes-assumes pattern,
or more generally the believes∗-assumes pattern:
A1 believes that A2 believes that . . .An believes that B assumes that
. . .
is that the Lawvere hypothesis of weak point surjectivity is propagated back
along belief chains.
– We furthermore give a compositional analysis of the believes-assumes pat-
tern, which characterizes what we call ‘belief-complete’ relations in terms of
this propagation property. This gives a rather definitive analysis for why the
BK argument takes the form it does.
– We then turn to the issue of the construction of assumption complete mod-
els. The categorical perspective allows us to apply general techniques from
coalgebra and domain theory to the construction of such models.
– Finally, we should mention the use of (elementary) methods from category
theory and categorical logic in this context as a methodological contribution.
While these may be unfamiliar to some, we believe that they are fully justified
in allowing the full scope and generality of the results, and the mathematical
contexts in which they may be applied, to be exposed.
The further contents of this paper are as follows. In Section 2, we review
the setting for the BK argument, and give our formulation of it as a fixpoint
lemma. In Section 3, we show how it can be formalized in regular logic. In Sec-
tion 4, we introduce the Lawvere fixpoint lemma. In Section 5 we bring BK and
Lawvere together, giving a relational reformulation of the Lawvere lemma, and
showing how to reduce BK to this version of Lawvere, i.e. the two-person to the
one-person argument. In Section 6, we give the multi-agent generalization, and
in Section 7 the compositional analysis of belief-completeness, and hence of the
believes-assumes pattern. In Section 8, we show how general functorial meth-
ods lead to the construction of assumption-complete models. Section 9 concludes
with some further directions.
2 The Brandenburger-Keisler Argument
A (two-person) belief structure has the form (Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb) where
Ra ⊆ Ua × Ub, Rb ⊆ Ub × Ua.
In the context of epistemic game theory, we think of Ua and Ub as type spaces
for Alice and Bob:
– Elements of Ua represent possible epistemic states of Alice in which she holds
beliefs about Bob, Bob’s beliefs, etc. Symmetrically, elements of Ub represent
possible epistemic states of Bob.
– The relations Ra ⊆ Ua×Ub, Rb ⊆ Ub×Ua specify these beliefs. Thus Ra(x, y)
expresses that in state x, Alice believes that state y is possible for Bob.
– We say that a state x ∈ Ua believes P ⊆ Ub if Ra(x) ⊆ P . Modal logic
provides a useful perspective on these notions, as shown by Eric Pacuit [19]
(see also [10]). Modally, ‘x believes P ’ is just x |= ✷aP where ✷a is the usual
necessity operator defined with respect to the relation Ra:
x |= ✷aφ ≡ ∀y.Ra(x, y)⇒ y |= φ.
– We say that x assumes P if Ra(x) = P . This is x |= ⊞aP , where ⊞a is the
modality defined by
x |= ⊞aφ ≡ ∀y.Ra(x, y)⇔ y |= φ.
A belief structure (Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb) is assumption-complete [10] with respect
to a collection of predicates on Ua and Ub if for every predicate P on Ub in the
collection, there is a state x on Ua such that x assumes P ; and similarly for the
predicates on Ua. (A predicate on a set U is just a subset of U .)
1
Brandenburger and Keisler show in [10] that this hypothesis, in the case
where the predicates include those definable in the first-order language of this
structure, leads to a contradiction. (They also show the existence of assumption
complete models for some other cases.)
Our aim is to understand the general structures underlying this argument.
Our first step is to recast their result as a positive one — a fixpoint lemma.
1 Related forms of completeness assumption are used in the analysis of various solution
concepts in games in [8,9].
2.1 The BK Fixpoint Lemma
We are given a belief structure (Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb). We assume that for ‘all’ (in some
‘definable’ class of) predicates p on Ua there is x0 such that:
Ra(x0) ⊆ {y | Rb(y) = {x | p(x)}}. (1)
∃y.Ra(x0, y). (2)
Modally, these assumptions can be expressed as follows:
x0 |= ✷a ⊞b p ∧ ✸a⊤.
Remark We can read (1) as saying: ‘x0 believes that (y assumes that p)’,
in the terminology of Brandenburger and Keisler.
Lemma 1 (Basic Lemma). From (1) and (2) we have:
p(x0) ⇐⇒ ∃y.[Ra(x0, y) ∧ Rb(y, x0)].
Proof Suppose p(x0). Take y as in (2), so Ra(x0, y). Then by (1), Rb(y, x0).
Now consider y satisfying Ra(x0, y) ∧ Rb(y, x0). By (1), from Ra(x0, y) we have
that Rb(y) = {x | p(x)}. Hence from Rb(y, x0) we have that p(x0). 
Lemma 2 (BK Fixpoint Lemma). Under our assumptions, every unary
propositional operator O has a fixpoint.
Proof Since p was arbitrary, we can define
q(x) ≡ ∃y.[Ra(x, y) ∧ Rb(y, x)] (3)
p(x) ≡ O(q(x)). (4)
(N.B. It is important that p is defined without reference to x0 to avoid circularity.)
These definitions combined with the equivalence given by the Basic Lemma
immediately yield:
O(q(x0))
(4)
≡ p(x0) ⇐⇒ ∃y.[Ra(x0, y) ∧ Rb(y, x0)
(3)
≡ q(x0),
so q(x0) is a fixpoint for the operator O, as required. 
Remarks Taking O ≡ ¬ yields the BK ‘paradox’. (In fact ¬q(x) is equivalent to
their ‘diagonal formula’ D in [10]).
In general, since our assumptions (1) and (2) are relative to a class of pred-
icates, this argument relies on q(x) and p(x) being in this class. Note that q(x)
only involves conjunction and existential quantification. This leads to our anal-
ysis of the logical resources needed to carry out the BK argument.
3 Formalizing BK in Regular Logic
We recall that regular logic is the fragment of (many-sorted) first-order logic
comprising sequents of the form
φ ⊢X ψ
where φ and ψ are built from atomic formulas by conjunction (including the
empty conjunction ⊤) and existential quantification; and X is a finite set of
variables which includes all those occurring free in φ and ψ. The intended mean-
ing of such a sequent is
∀x1 · · · ∀xn[φ⇒ ψ]
where X = {x1, . . . , xn}. This is a common fragment of intuitionistic and clas-
sical logic. It plays a core roˆle in categorical logic. A convenient summary of
regular logic can be found in the lecture notes by Carsten Butz [11].
We shall write ⊢X ψ for the sequent ⊤ ⊢X ψ, and φ ⊢ ψ for φ ⊢∅ ψ.
We shall assume a logical vocabulary containing the sorts Ua and Ub, and
binary relation symbols Ra : Ua×Ub and Rb : Ub×Ua, together with a constant
c : Ua which will correspond to x0 in the informal argument given in the previous
section. Thus c is associated with the given predicate p, which will be represented
by a formula in one free variable of sort Ua.
The assumptions given in the informal argument can be expressed as regular
sequents as follows.
(A1) Ra(c, y) ∧ Rb(y, x) ⊢{x,y} p(x)
(A2) Ra(c, y) ∧ p(x) ⊢{x,y} Rb(y, x)
(A3) ⊢ ∃y.Ra(c, y)
Here (A1) and (A2) correspond to assumption (1) in the informal argument,
while (A3) corresponds to assumption (2).
The formal version of Lemma 1 is as follows:
Lemma 3. From (A1)–(A3) we can infer the following sequents:
(F1) p(c) ⊢ q(c)
(F2) q(c) ⊢ p(c)
where
q(x) ≡ ∃y.[Ra(x, y) ∧ Rb(y, x)].
A definable unary propositional operator will be represented by a formula context
O[·], which is a closed formula built from atomic formulas, plus a ‘hole’ [·]. We
obtain a formula O[φ] by replacing every occurrence of the hole by a formula φ.
The formal version of the Fixpoint Lemma is now stated as follows:
Lemma 4. Under the assumptions (A1)–(A3), every definable unary proposi-
tional operator O[·] has a fixpoint, i.e. a sentence S such that
S ⊢ O[S], O[S] ⊢ S.
This is obtained directly from the previous lemma, taking p(x) ≡ O[q(x)]. The
required sentence S is then q(c).
Remarks
– Regular logic can be interpreted in any regular category [23,11]: well-powered
with finite limits and images, which are stable under pullbacks.2 These are
exactly the categories which support a good calculus of relations.
– The BK fixpoint lemma is valid in any such category. Regular categories
are abundant — they include all (pre)toposes, all abelian categories, all
equational varieties of algebras, compact Hausdorff spaces, and categories of
Q-sets for right quantales Q.
– If the propositional operator O is fixpoint-free, the result must be read con-
trapositively, as showing that the assumptions (A1)–(A3) lead to a contra-
diction. This will of course be the case if O = ¬[·] in either classical or
intuitionistic logic. This yields exactly the BK argument.
– In other contexts, this need not be the case. For example if the propositions
(in categorical terms, the subobjects of the terminal object) form a complete
lattice, and O is monotone, then by the Tarski-Knaster theorem there will
indeed be a fixpoint. This offers a general setting for understanding why
positive logics, in which all definable propositional operators are monotone,
allow the paradoxes to be circumvented.
4 The Lawvere Fixpoint Lemma
We start off concretely working in Set. Suppose we have a function
g : X → VX
or equivalently, by cartesian closure:
gˆ : X ×X → V
Think of V as a set of ‘truth values’: VX is the set of ‘V-valued predicates’. Then
g is showing how predicates on X can be represented by elements of X . In terms
of gˆ: a predicate p : X → V is representable by x ∈ X if for all y ∈ X :
p(y) = gˆ(x, y)
Note that, if predicates ‘talk about’ X , then representable predicates allow X
to ‘talk about itself’.
If g is surjective, then every predicate on X is representable in X . When can
this happen?
Proposition 1 (Lawvere Fixpoint Lemma). Suppose that g : X → VX is
surjective. Then every function α : V → V has a fixpoint: v ∈ V such that
α(v) = v.
2 There is a brief review of these notions in Section 5.1.
Proof Define a predicate p by
X ×X
gˆ ✲ V
X
∆
✻
p
✲ V
α
❄
There is x ∈ X which represents p: then
p(x) = α(gˆ(∆(x))) = α(gˆ(x, x)) = α(p(x))
so p(x) is a fixpoint of α. 
Remarks on the proof Note firstly that the proof is constructive. The crucial
idea is that it uses two descriptions of p — one from its definition, one from its
representation via gˆ. And since x represents p, p(x) is (indirect) self-application.
But does this make sense? Say that X has the fixpoint property if every
endofunction on X has a fixpoint. Of course, no set with more than one element
has the fixpoint property!
Basic example: 2 = {0, 1}. The negation
¬0 = 1, ¬1 = 0
does not have a fixpoint. So the meaning of the theorem in Set must be taken
contrapositively:
For all sets X , V where V has more than one element, there is no surjective
map
X → VX
Two Applications
Cantor’s Theorem Take V = 2. There is no surjective map X → 2X and
hence |P(X)| 6≤ |X |.
We can apply the fixpoint lemma to any putative such map, with α = ¬, to
get the usual ‘diagonalization argument’.
Russell’s Paradox Let S be a ‘universe’ (set) of sets. Let gˆ : S ×S → 2 define
the membership relation:
gˆ(x, y)⇔ y ∈ x
Then there is a predicate which can be defined on S, and which is not
representable by any element of S.
Such a predicate is given by the standard Russell set, which arises by apply-
ing the fixpoint lemma with α = ¬.
4.1 Abstract Version of the Basic Lemma
Lawvere’s argument was in the setting of cartesian (closed) categories. Amaz-
ingly, it only needs finite products.3
Let C be a category with finite products. The terminal object (empty product)
is written as 1. In Set it is any one-point set.
Definition 1 (Lawvere). An arrow f : A×A→ V is weakly point surjective
(wps) if for every p : A→ V there is an x : 1→ A such that, for all y : 1→ A:
p ◦ y = f ◦ 〈x, y〉 : 1→ V
In this case, we say that p is represented by x.
Proposition 2 (Abstract Fixpoint Lemma). Let C be a category with finite
products. If f : A×A→ V is weakly point surjective, then every endomorphism
α : V → V has a fixpoint v : 1→ V such that α ◦ v = v.
Proof Define p : A→ V by
A×A
f ✲ V
A
∆A
✻
p
✲ V
α
❄
Suppose p is represented by x : 1→ A. Then
p ◦ x = α ◦ f ◦∆A ◦ x def of p
= α ◦ f ◦ 〈x, x〉 diagonal
= α ◦ p ◦ x x represents p.
So p ◦ x is a fixpoint of α. 
In [16], the Fixpoint Lemma is used to derive Go¨del’s First Incompleteness
Theorem. Yanofsky’s paper covers many more applications: semantic paradozes
(Liar, Berry, Richard), the Halting Problem, existence of an oracle B such that
PB 6= NPB, Parikh sentences, Lo¨b’s paradox, the Recursion theorem, Rice’s
theorem, von Neumann’s self-reproducing automata, . . .
All of these are ‘one-person’ results. The question of applying this argument
to a two-person scenario such as the BK paradox has remained open.
3 In fact, even less suffices: just monoidal structure and a ‘diagonal’ satisfying only
point naturality and monoidality.
5 Reducing BK to Lawvere
How do we relate Lawvere to BK? As we have seen, the BK argument is valid
in any regular category. This is pretty general. Nevertheless, BK needs a richer
setting than Lawvere. To find common ground between them, we reformulate
Lawvere, replacing maps by relations.
As a preliminary, we firstly review how regular logic is interpreted in any
regular category.
5.1 Brief Review of Categorical Logic
We shall assume familiarity with some very basic category theory: the notions of
category, functor, natural transformation, epis, monos, isomorphisms, products
and pullbacks. Any introductory text, such as the excellent (and gentle) [20],
covers these in a few pages.
We shall briefly review how formulas of regular logic are interpreted in any
category with suitable structure — the regular categories. For a very clear and
detailed expository account of this material, see the lecture notes [11]. Another
excellent set of lecture notes [23] covers both the basic category theory and
regular logic.
We firstly recall the notion of subobject of an object A in a category C. If
m1 : M1✲ ✲ A and m2 : M2✲ ✲ A are monomorphisms, we write m1 . m2
if m1 factors through m2:
M2✲
m2 ✲ A
M1
✻
................
✲
m
1
✲
Note that if such an arrow exists, it is unique, and a monomorphism. In Set, if
m1 and m2 are inclusion mappings, the relation expresses that the subset M1 is
included in the subsetM2. The relation . is a preorder (reflexive and transitive)
and we can factor through by the corresponding equivalence relation to form a
partial order. If the collection of equivalence classes forms a set (not a proper
class) for every object A, we say that C is well-powered.4 In this case we write
Sub(A) for the set of equivalence classes — the subobjects of A. Now suppose
4 There is a minor technicality lurking here. The equivalence classes of monomor-
phisms may themselves be proper classes. So more precisely, we should ask that this
collection is in bijection with a set
that C has finite limits. In a pullback diagram
• > •
A
m′
∨
∨
f
> B
m
∨
∨
it is always true that if m is mono, so is m′. Moreover, this action of f on monos
by pullback is monotone with respect to the preorder .. Hence there is a well
defined map f∗ : Sub(B) → Sub(A). (In the case of Set, pullbacks of monos
correspond to inverse images of subsets.) This assignment f 7→ f∗ is moreover
(contravariantly) functorial, and we get a functor
Sub : Cop → Set
which assigns Sub(A) to each object A of C and f∗ to each arrow f .
We interpret a many-sorted logical vocabulary in a regular category C by
assigning an object of C to each sort5, an arrow c : 1 → A to each constant
c of sort A, and a subobject in Sub(A1 × · · · × An) to each relation symbol
R : (A1, . . . , An).
Substitution is captured by pullback. Two examples will suffice. Given a
predicate P✲ ✲ A and a constant c : 1→ A,
JP (c)K = c∗(P ).
Given a relation R✲ ✲ A×A:
JR(x, x)K = ∆∗A(R).
Conjunction is interpreted by pullbacks. The greatest lower bound of subobjects
[m1], [m2] in the partial order Sub(A) is computed on representatives by the
pullback
• > •
A
∨
∨
m1
> B
m2
∨
∨
If m1 and m2 are inclusion mappings in Set, one can check that the pullback is
given by the intersection of the corresponding subsets.
5 We shall not distinguish notationally between a syntactic sort and the corresponding
object.
Finally, regular categories allow existential quantification to be interpreted.
Given a formula φ(x, y) where Jφ(x, y)K ∈ Sub(A×B), the projection pi : A×B →
B yields
pi∗ : Sub(B)→ Sub(A×B).
In a regular category, this map has a left adjoint
∃pi : Sub(A×B)→ Sub(B)
which allows existential quantification to be interpreted:
J∃x. φ(x, y)K = ∃pi(Jφ(x, y)K).
Thus formulas of regular logic can be interpreted in regular categories. Now
suppose we are given a regular sequent φ ⊢X ψ, where X = x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An.
The interpretations of the formulas φ, ψ live in the same poset of subobjects:
JφK, JψK ∈ Sub(A1 × · · · ×An). (This is why it is important to specify X). Then
the sequent is true in the interpretation if JφK ≤ JψK.
The rules of regular logic (just standard rules for this fragment of first-order
logic) are sound in any regular category, and thus we can use logic to reason
about relations in a wide variety of mathematical contexts. There is also a form
of strong completeness theorem. For further details, see [11].
5.2 Relational Reformulation of Lawvere
As a first step, we reformulate Lawvere’s notion of weak point surjectivity in
relational terms.
To see how to do this, imagine the Lawvere wps situation
gˆ : X ×X → Ω
is happening in a topos, and Ω is the subobject classifier. In the case of Set,
Ω is just 2, and we are appealing to the familiar identification P(X) = 2X of
subsets with characteristic functions.
Then this map gˆ corresponds to a relation
R✲ ✲ X ×X
Such a relation is weakly point surjective (wps) if for every subobject p✲ ✲ X
there is x : 1→ X such that, for all y : 1→ A:
JR(x, y)K = Jp(y)K
or in logical terms
R(x, y)⇐⇒ p(y).
In fact, a weaker notion suffices to prove the Fixpoint Lemma (cf. [22]). We
say that R is very weakly point surjective (vwps) if for every subobject p✲ ✲ X
there is x : 1→ X such that:
JR(x, x)K = Jp(x)K.
5.3 What is a ‘propositional operator’?
To find the right ‘objective’ — i.e. language independent — notion, once again
we consider the topos case, and translate out of that into something which makes
sense much more widely.
In a topos, a propositional operator is an endomorphism of the subobject
classifier
α : Ω → Ω
(In more familiar terms: an operator on the lattice of truth values, as e.g. in
Boolean Algebras with Operators.) This corresponds to the endomorphism of V
in Lawvere’s original formulation.
Note that by Yoneda, since Sub ∼= C(−, Ω), such endomorphisms of Ω cor-
respond bijectively with endomorphisms of the subobject functor — i.e. natural
transformations
τ : Sub =⇒ Sub.
Thus this is the right semantic notion of ‘propositional operator’ in general.
Naturality corresponds to commuting with substitution.
5.4 The Relational Lawvere Lemma
Lemma 5 (Relational Lawvere fixpoint lemma). If R is a vwps relation
on X in a regular category6, then every endomorphism of the subobject functor
τ : Sub =⇒ Sub
has a fixpoint.
Note that a fixpointK1 =⇒ Sub from the constant functor valued at the terminal
object is determined by its value at Sub(1).
Proof We define a predicate P (x) ≡ τ(R(x, x)), so JP K = τX(∆
∗
X(R)). By
vwps, there is c : 1→ X such that:
JP (c)K = c∗(JP K) = 〈c, c〉∗(R) = JR(c, c)K.
Then
JP (c)K = c∗(JP K) = c∗(τX(∆
∗
X(R)) = τ1(c
∗ ◦∆∗X(R))
= τ1((∆X ◦ c)
∗(R)) = τ1(〈c, c〉
∗(R))
= τ1(c
∗(JP K)) = τ1(JP (c)K).

6 In fact, it suffices to assume that the category is well-powered and has finite limits.
5.5 From BK to Lawvere
Now given relations
Ra✲ ✲ A×B, Rb✲ ✲ B ×A
we can form their relational composition R✲ ✲ A×A:
JR(x1, x2)K ≡ J∃y. [Ra(x1, y) ∧ Rb(y, x2)]K
Our Basic Lemma can now be restated as follows:
Lemma 6. If Ra and Rb satisfy the BK assumptions (A1)–(A3), then R is
vwps.
Hence the relational Lawvere fixpoint lemma applies! As an immediate Corol-
lary, we obtain:
Lemma 7 (BK Fixpoint Lemma). If Ra and Rb satisfy the BK assumptions
(A1)–(A3), then every endomorphism of the subobject functor has a fixpoint.
6 Multi-Agent Generalization of BK
A multiagent belief structure in a regular category is
({Ai}i∈I , {Rij}(i,j)∈I×I)
where
Rij✲ ✲ Ai × Aj .
A belief cycle in such a structure is
A
R1
+ ✲ A1
R2
+ ✲ · · ·
Rn
+ ✲ An
Rn+1
+ ✲ A
where we write R : B +✲ C if R is a relation of the indicated type, i.e. a
subobject of B × C.
We now formulate Generalized BK Assumptions for such a belief cycle:
For each subobject p✲ ✲ A, there is some c : 1→ A such that
c |= ✷1 · · ·✷n ⊞n+1 p
∧
✸1⊤ ∧ ✷1✸2⊤ ∧ · · · ∧ ✷1 · · ·✷n−1✸n⊤
These assumptions can be written straightforwardly as regular sequents.
Multiagent BK Fixpoint Lemma We can define the relation R = R1; · · · ;Rn+1 :
A +✲ A.
Lemma 8 (Generalized Basic Lemma). Under the Generalized BK assump-
tions, R is vwps.
Hence the Relational Fixpoint Lemma applies. Note that in the one-person
case n = 0, assumption completeness coincides with weak point surjectivity.
In modal terms:
c |= ⊞p ≡ ∀x.R(c, x)⇔ p(x).
One-person BK is (relational) Lawvere! The force of the BK argument is that
the (very) wps property propagates back along belief chains.
In particular, this produces the ‘believes-assumes’ construction of BK, or
the generalized version believes∗-assumes, in which ‘believes’ is iterated n
times followed by an ‘assumes’.
7 Compositional Analysis
We shall briefly consider the issue of compositional gluing of belief relations with
given completeness properties. For simplicity, we shall conduct our discussion
concretely, in terms of relations on sets. To incorporate the idea of relativization
to a set of predicates, we shall assume that each set A is given together with a
set P(A) ⊆ P(A) \ {∅} of (non-empty) predicates on A.
Suppose we are given a relation R : A +✲ B. We say that R is assumption-
complete (with respect to P) if for every p ∈ P(B), for some x ∈ A, for all
y ∈ B:
R(x, y) ⇔ p(y).
This is just wps again, of course.
We say that it is belief-complete if for all y ∈ B:
R(x, y) ⇒ p(y).
and also ∃y.R(x, y). Modally, this corresponds to
x |= ✷p ∧ ✸⊤.
Now suppose we have relations
Rab : A +✲ B, Rbc : B +✲ C.
We define
⊞bcp = {y ∈ B | Rbc(y) = p}.
Lemma 9 (Composition Lemma). Suppose that:
1. Rab is belief-complete with respect to P(B).
2. Rbc is assumption-complete with respect to P(C).
3. For each p ∈ P(C), ⊞bcp ∈ P(B).
Then the composition Rac = Rab;Rbc : A +✲ C is assumption-complete with
respect to P(C).
Note the need for the comprehension assumption (3).
We now prove a kind of converse to the Composition Lemma, which charac-
terises belief-completeness, and shows why the BK assumptions and the believes-
assumes pattern arise in this context.
Theorem 1 (Compositional Characterization). A relation R : A +✲ B
is belief complete with respect to P(B) if and only if, for every S : B +✲ C
such that
1. S is assumption complete with respect to P(C)
2. ⊞Sp ∈ P(B) for every p ∈ P(C)
the composition R;S : A +✲ C is assumption complete with respect to P(C).
Proof The left to right implication is Lemma 9.
For the converse, we suppose that R is not belief-complete for some p ∈ P(B).
We let C = {0, 1}, and define S to be the characteristic function of p. We take
P(C) = {q}, where q = {1}. Note that ⊞q = p, and that S is assumption
complete with respect to P(C) — indeed, any element of p, which by our general
assumption on predicates is non-empty, assumes q.
We claim that R;S is not assumption complete for q. Indeed, for any x ∈ A,
if R(x) = ∅, then R;S(x) = ∅, and so x does not assume q. The only other
possibility, since by assumption R is not belief complete with respect to p, is
that for some y 6∈ p, R(x, y). In this case, R;S(x, 0), and so x does not assume
q. 
Remark The proof of the Compositional Characterization Theorem assumes that
we have the freedom to choose any collection of predicates we like on a given
set. It would be useful to have a more general formulation and result.
8 Functorial Constructions of Assumption-Complete
Models
We now turn to the question of constructing belief models which are assumption
complete with respect to a natural class of predicates. The categorical perspec-
tive is well-suited to this task. Indeed, leaving aside model-theoretic subtleties,
we can identify the problem as essentially one of finding fixpoints for certain
‘powerset-like’ functors. This ‘recursion in the large’ at the level of types, to
support ‘recursion in the small’ at the level of programs, is a familiar theme
in Theoretical Computer Science [4]. If we think of recursion as enabling self-
reference, in formulas rather than programs, we see the link to the ideas being
considered here. Powerful general methods are available for finding such fix-
points, as solutions of domain equations [4] or final coalgebras [21].
The problem can be phrased as follows, in the setting of the strategy-based
belief models of [10]. We are given strategy sets Sa, Sb for Alice and Bob respec-
tively. We want to find sets of types Ta and Tb such that
Ta ∼= P(Ub), Tb ∼= P(Ua) (5)
where Ua = Sa × Ta and Ub = Sb × Tb are the sets of states for Alice and
Bob. Naively, P is powerset, but in fact it must be a restricted set of subsets
(extensions of predicates) defined in some more subtle way, or such a structure
would be impossible by mere cardinality considerations.
Thus a state for Alice is a pair (s, t) where s is a strategy from her strategy-
set and t is a type. Given an isomorphism α : Ta
∼=✲ P(Ub), we can define a
relation Ra : Ua +✲ Ub by:
Ra((s, t), (s
′, t′)) ≡ (s′, t′) ∈ α(t).
Note that (s, t) assumes α(t). Because α is an isomorphism, the belief model
(Ua, Ub, Ra, Rb) is automatically assumption complete with respect to P(Ua) and
P(Ub).
In fact, having isomorphisms α : Ta
∼=✲ P(Ub), β : Tb
∼=✲ P(Ua) is more
than is strictly required for assumption completeness. It would be sufficient to
have retractions
Ta ✄P(Ub), Tb ✄P(Ua)
i.e. maps
ra : Ta → P(Ub), sa : P(Ub)→ Ta
such that ra ◦ sa = idP(Ub), and similarly for Tb and P(Ua).
7 However, we shall
emphasize the situation where we do have isomorphisms, where we can really
speak of canonical solutions.
We shall now generalize this situation so as to clarify what the mathematical
form of the problem is. Suppose that we have a category C, which we assume to
have finite products, and a functor P : C → C. We are given objects Sa and Sb
in C. Hence we can define functors Fa, Fb : C → C:
Fa(Y ) = P(Sb × Y ), Fb(X) = P(Sa ×X).
Intuitively, Fa provides one level of beliefs which Alice may hold about states
which combine strategies for Bob with ‘types’ from the ‘parameter space’ Y ; and
symmetrically for Fb.
Now we define a functor F : C × C → C × C on the product category:
F (X,Y ) = (Fa(Y ), Fb(X)).
7 Brandenburger and Keisler ask only for surjections, but they are working in a setting
where surjections can always be split.
To ask for a pair of isomorphisms as in (5) is to ask for a fixpoint of the functor
F : an object of C × C (hence a pair of objects of C, (Ta, Tb)) such that
(Ta, Tb) ∼= F (Ta, Tb).
This situation has been extensively studied in Category Theory and Theoretical
Computer Science [21,7,4]. In particular, the notion of final coalgebra provides
a canonical form of solution. Once again, previous work has focussed on ‘one-
person’ situations, although the tools needed for two- or multi-agent forms of
solution — essentially the ability to solve simultaneous equations — are already
in hand. We shall briefly review some standard notions on coalgebra before
applying them to the construction of assumption-complete models.
8.1 Brief Review of Coalgebra
Let F : C → C be a functor. An F -coalgebra is a pair (A,α) where A is an
object of C, and α is an arrow α : A→ FA. We say that A is the carrier of the
coalgebra, while α is the behaviour map.
An F -coalgebra homomorphism from (A,α) to (B, β) is an arrow h : A→ B
such that
A
α ✲ FA
B
h
❄
β
✲ FB
Fh
❄
F -coalgebras and their homomorphisms form a category F−Coalg.
An F -coalgebra (C, γ) is final if for every F -coalgebra (A,α) there is a unique
homomorphism from (A,α) to (C, γ), i.e. if it is the terminal object in F−Coalg.
Proposition 3. If a final F -coalgebra exists, it is unique up to isomorphism.
Proposition 4 (Lambek Lemma). If γ : C → FC is final, it is an isomor-
phism
Final coalgebras subsume what are known as terminal models in the literature
on type spaces. A standard way of constructing final coalgebras is by a ‘terminal
sequence’ [7,24]
1← F (1)← F 2(1)← · · ·F k(1)← · · ·
This sequence continues at a limit ordinal λ by taking the limit of the diagram
constructed at the previous stages, and at a successor ordinal λ+1 by applying
F to all arrows Aµ ← Aν constructed at previous stages, with µ ≤ ν. If at
some stage λ the arrow Aλ ← Aλ+1 = F (Aλ) is an isomorphism, we have con-
structed the final coalgebra.8 This form of construction is used in the literature
on Harsanyi type spaces [13] to construct what are known as universal models.
Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet gave the first construction of a universal type
space in the category of measurable spaces [14], following other work in more
restricted contexts. Subsequently, Larry Moss and Ignacio Viglizzo made explicit
use of final coalgebra ideas to clarify and generalize this construction [18]. Their
focus was on the category of measurable spaces. Our contribution here is to set
the discussion in a wider context, emphasizing the construction of interactive
belief models which are assumption complete.
Thus these well-developed methods from Theoretical Computer Science can
be used to address the following question raised by Brandenburger and Keisler:
We end by noting that, to the best of our knowledge, no general
treatment exists of the relationship between universal, complete, and
terminal models (absent specific structure). Such a treatment would be
very useful.
The topic deserves a fuller treatment than is possible here. We shall content
ourselves with giving some examples where known results on the existence of
final coalgebras can be applied to yield assumption complete models.
8.2 Application to Assumption Complete Models
We begin by noting that standard results allow us to lift one-person to two- (or
multi-)agent constructions. Suppose we have endofunctors G1, G2 : C → C. We
can define a functor
G : C × C → C × C :: G(X,Y ) = (G1(Y ), G2(X)).
Note that this directly generalizes our definition of F from Fa and Fb. We have
G = (G1 × G2) ◦ twist. It is standard that if G1 and G2 satisfy continuity or
accessibility hypotheses which guarantee that they have final coalgebras, so will
G.
Note that the final sequence for G will have the form
(1,1)← (G1(1), G2(1))← (G1(G2(1)), G2(G1(1))←
· · · ← ((G1 ◦G2)
k(1), (G2 ◦G1)
k(1))← · · ·
This ‘symmetric feedback’ is directly analogous to constructions which arise in
Geometry of Interaction and the Int construction [3,1,5]. It is suggestive of a
compositional structure for interactive belief models.
We shall now consider three specific settings where the general machinery
we have described can be applied to construct assumption complete models as
final coalgebras. In each case we must specify the ambient category C, and the
functor P.
8 This method will work for any monic-preserving accessible endofunctor on a locally
presentable category [24].
Sets We firstly consider Set, the category of sets and functions. Our candidate
for P is a variant of the powerset functor. We take P(X) = Pκ(X), the collection
of all subsets of X of cardinality less than κ, where κ is an inaccessible cardinal.9
It is standard that, for any sets Sa, Sb, the functors Fa and Fb are accessible,
and hence so is the functor F = (Fa × Fb) ◦ twist : C × C → C × C. Hence we get
a final coalgebra
γ : (Ta, Tb)
∼=✲ (Pκ(Sa × Tb),Pκ(Sb × Ta)).
This yields an assumption complete belief model, as previously discussed.
Note that the terminal sequence for this functor is always transfinite, as
analyzed in detail in [24]. Even in the case κ = ω (finite subsets), ω + ω stages
are required for convergence to the final coalgebra.
Stone Spaces Another convenient setting for final coalgebra is the category
of Stone spaces, i.e. totally disconnected compact Haussdorff spaces [2,15]. By
Stone duality, this category is dual to the category of Boolean algebras. Our
candidate for P here is the Vietoris powerspace construction [17]. In [2], one can
find essentially a treatment of the one-person case of the situation being consid-
ered here. The final coalgebra constructed here is closely related to the model
built in a more concrete fashion in [10]. We get stronger properties (isomorphism
rather than surjection) and a clearer relation to general theory.
In this case, the final coalgebra is reached after ω stages of the terminal
sequence, because of continuity properties of the functor.
Algebraic Lattices As a final example, we venture into the realm of Domain
theory [12,4]. We work in the category of algebraic lattices and Scott-continuous
maps (those preserving directed joins). We have two convenient choices for P:
the lower and upper powerdomain constructions, both well-studied in Domain
theory. In the first case, we take the lattice of Scott-closed subsets of an alge-
braic lattice, ordered by inclusion. In the second, we take the subsets which are
compact in the Scott topology, and upwards closed in the partial ordering, or-
dered by reverse inclusion. In either case, we obtain a continuous functor, which
converges to the final coalgebra in ω stages of the terminal sequence.
Closure under logical constructions We have constructed models which are
assumption complete in a semantic sense, with respect to the predicates specified
by the functor P. A further issue is how expressive these collections of predi-
cates are; this can be made precise in terms of which logical constructions they
are closed under, and hence which logics can be interpreted. Brandenburger and
9 Alternatively, and essentially equivalently, we can follow Peter Aczel [6], and work
over the (‘superlarge’) category of classes, taking P(A) to be the class of sub-sets of
a class A.
Keisler show that their topological belief model is closed under conjunction, dis-
junction, existential and universal quantification, and constructions correspond-
ing to the assumes and believes modalities. The same arguments show that
our model in Stone spaces is closed under these constructions. Similar arguments
show that the model in Set is also closed under these constructions. In this case,
closure under the believes modality requires that if a set S has cardinality less
than κ, so does its powerset. This follows from the inaccessibility of κ. Finally,
the models in algebraic lattices are also closed under these constructions, with
the proviso that appropriate order-theoretic saturation (upwards or downwards
closure) must be applied in some cases.
These models also allow for various forms of recursive definition. We leave a
detailed account to an extended version of this paper.
9 Further Directions
There are a number of natural directions to be pursued. One is to a more com-
prehensive account of the construction of belief models and type spaces, taking
full advantage of the use of categorical methods, and of developments in coalge-
braic logic. Another is to a finer analysis of the use of completeness hypotheses
in justifying solution concepts for games. Finally, we would like to pursue the
broader agenda of understanding the mathematical structure of interaction, and
the scope of interactive versions of logical and mathematical phenomena which
have previously only been studied in ‘one-person’ versions.
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